Middle East geopolitical scenario

Colin Clarke

Inserted 2 days ago

“If Syria's new rulers manage to effectively run the country, it would serve as a real momentum boost for Islamist groups. To the leadership in U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia, there is a concern that the takeover of Syria by HTS will energize Islamists in those countries, and if [Ahmed al-Sharaa] succeeds in governing, it will be proof of concept for groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Rferl

Director of policy and research at the New York-based Soufan Group intelligence consultancy

18 Jan 2025 10 7

Robin Yassin-Kassab

Inserted 2 days ago

“He's [Ahmad al-Awda] an opportunist or an intelligent and pragmatic player, depending on your perspective. In effect, [Awda] achieved a low level of autonomy. He became a local warlord. I'm sure the U.A.E. and [Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah] Sisi would aid an insurgency if one gets going in Syria. It depends on how effectively and quickly the new Syrian administration can establish order and authority. But if things in general degenerate, then [Awda] could be one warlord who might take foreign funds.”

Rferl

Expert on Syria and the co-author of 'Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and in War'

18 Jan 2025 9 8

Daria Isachenko

Inserted 4 weeks ago

“Turkey has had three core concerns in Syria: fighting the YPG/PYD, enabling the return of Syrian refugees to Syria, and preventing further refugee flows into Turkey. Assad's downfall on December 8 has stemmed the influx of refugees into Turkey, but the first two concerns remain. Turkey's growing influence in Syria could further strengthen its position in the Mediterranean Sea if Ankara signs a Libya-style maritime deal with the new authorities in Damascus.”

Rferl

Turkey expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs

23 Dec 2024 9 5

Behnam Taleblu

Inserted 4 weeks ago

“The Islamic republic has had significant misgivings about Turkish influence in Syria, be it economic, political, or military, long before the fall of Assad. But with the loss of Iran's sole state ally in the region, these concerns are set to be magnified exponentially. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will look for ways to claw back influence in Syria. Downtrodden, disposed, and spurned local actors are easy to co-opt, particularly in states where central authority is weak.”

Rferl

Senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank

23 Dec 2024 7 6

William Matthews

Inserted 1 month ago

“For China, the fall of Assad does represent the loss of a diplomatic partner. China's overall approach in the region has been one of pragmatic engagement. While the HTS is unlikely to be keen to work with China as a close partner, China will most likely seek to maintain engagement with the new government, including with a view to opportunities for cooperation. China's engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan could provide a potential comparison but it is too early to say so definitively. Given that China has adopted a more cautious approach to overseas investments in recent years, while it is possible that China might make new investments in Syria, these will likely be calibrated against the risk of instability and potential opportunities for increased longer-term influence. Al-Assad's fall poses a challenge for China because China has growing interests in the Middle East region as an economic and development partner, and increasingly in areas such as technology and defence.”

Aljazeera

Senior research fellow for the Asia Pacific Programme at London-based think tank Chatham House

11 Dec 2024 7 4

Marwan Bishara

Inserted 1 month ago

“Israel believes that it can get away with the assaults it is carrying out in the region. Many of the Israeli ministers in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government perceive parts of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon as being parts of the 'greater Israel' that they were promised. They take advantage of each and every pretext, of each and every opportunity in order to expand that territory. It is something that they have their eye on, and they will continually expand, and take advantage of weaknesses around them.”

Aje

Senior political analyst at Al Jazeera

10 Dec 2024 5 5

Farzan Sabet

Inserted 1 month ago

“After the loss of the land corridor connecting axis members from Iran to Lebanon, we are likely to see a much-diminished resistance in the coming months and years. The axis will have a considerably lower capacity to rebuild or conduct military operations in the future. Things look equally grim for Iran's axis of resistance. Tehran will be under pressure to pull back its regional activities. Iran will seek to exploit any potential chaos in the region, including in post-Assad Syria, to reassert its influence. If the civil war in Syria is not quickly settled and a new order created, it might become precisely the type of environment where the Islamic republic has historically thrived.”

Rferl

Senior research associate at the Geneva Graduate Institute

09 Dec 2024 6 4

Ali Vaez

Inserted 1 month ago

“There is no axis without access. The resistance is not done, but losing the ability to logistically support Hezbollah means the loss of Iran's strategic depth.”

Rferl

International Crisis Group’s Iran Project Director and Senior Adviser to the President

09 Dec 2024 2 4

Eugene Rumer

Inserted 1 month ago

“Syria is their only real foothold in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The rebel victory has become part of the price they are paying for the war in Ukraine. What good is Russia as a partner if it cannot save its oldest client in the Middle East from a ragtag band of militias? Besides the operational setback, it is also a diplomatic and reputational blow.”

Nytimes

Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington

08 Dec 2024 4 5

Rami George Khouri

Inserted 1 month ago

“What has happened in Syria should be a wake-up call for all Arab autocrats. The region cannot endure long the reality that not a single Arab state has been credibly validated by its own people through constitutional or electoral means.”

Aljazeera

Public policy fellow at the American University of Beirut

08 Dec 2024 3 3

Emile Hokayem

Inserted 2 months ago

“In Assad's view, a weakened Iran and Hizbollah could allow him to rely more on Russia and to court the Gulf and other Arab states. Seeking funding and political respectability, he sees Moscow as well placed to counter western influence, facilitate a rapprochement with Turkey and accelerate Arab re-engagement. This is why he was beaming while attending the Riyadh conference to promote Palestinian statehood last week. He particularly enjoyed the meeting with the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who had ended his exclusion from the Arab League in 2023.”

Ft

Senior fellow for Middle East security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

18 Nov 2024 11 8

Anna Jacobs

Inserted 2 months ago

“Donald Trump's election last week for a second term in the White House is likely to be on leaders' minds in Riyadh. This summit is very much an opportunity for regional leaders to signal to the incoming Trump administration what they want in terms of US engagement. The message will likely be one of dialogue, de-escalation and calling out Israeli military campaigns in the region.”

Aljazeera

Senior Gulf analyst for the International Crisis Group think tank

11 Nov 2024 6 4

Tohid Asadi

Inserted 2 months ago

“In a rare visit to Tehran, this high-ranking Saudi Arabian delegate, headed by the chief of staff, met with his Iranian counterpart here in the capital. The discussions, as expected, revolved around military and defense issues, and specifically, they talked about the expansion of cooperation in this particular arena. They also discussed a drill-a military naval drill between the two countries. Around three weeks ago, Iranian Naval Commander Shahram Irani said that there is a possibility of such a military drill between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two regional powerhouses with a history of rivalry, so it could be considered a step forward in the ties between the two. Added to that is the discussion they had regarding regional issues, in particular the Palestinian issue, which was a key point of concern for both sides; they had a conversation on that as well. This visit takes place after the election of Trump in the United States, who promised peace in West Asia. However, the possibility of tensions ramping up to the next level is still here, so the two sides-I mean Iran and Saudi Arabia-are indeed trying to make sure that everything is on the right track. They are trying to build a sort of confidence when it comes to collective action against collective threats. All in all, I think Iran, in this regard, tries to send two clear messages. The first message relates to the urgency of this collective action against Israeli aggressive behaviors; this has been emphasized by Iranian officials several times. The second message that Iranians are trying to send is that if their land - if Iranian sovereignty - is attacked by aerospace or land of any third country, there would be a possibility of further escalation and a full-fledged, all-out war scenario.”

Youtube

Writer and specialist in Iranian affairs

10 Nov 2024 10 3

Abbas Araghchi

Inserted 2 months ago

“The world should know that in case of the expansion of war, its harmful effects will not be limited only to the West Asia region. Insecurity and instability can spread to other regions, even far away.”

Aje

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran

09 Nov 2024 4 4

Alon Liel

Inserted 2 months ago

“Things have to be done internationally in a more aggressive way in order to stop the war. It's not only a Gaza or Lebanon catastrophe, we will end up with an Israeli catastrophe, too. To save the region, including Israel, the international community must be more decisive after the American election. Granting Palestine member-state status at the United Nations is a good first step towards stabilising the Middle East. But British and American coordination is the key to halt the escalating fighting. It's so urgent it has to be done in November and December.”

Aje

Former director of Israel’s foreign ministry

25 Oct 2024 8 6

Ali Shihabi

Inserted 3 months ago

“The Abraham Accords were cosmetic; there was nothing substantive about them when it comes to a real, enduring regional peace agreement. Many of the states that signed on did so because they see Israel as a path to influence in Washington. But now we see that the U.S. has no power or influence over Israel - to a humiliating degree and that the Israelis have no intention to create a Palestinian state.”

Nytimes

20 Oct 2024 5 3

Ali Shihabi

Inserted 3 months ago

“What Gaza has done is set back any Israeli integration into the region. Saudi Arabia sees that any association with Israel has become more toxic since Gaza, unless the Israelis change their spots and show a real commitment to a Palestinian state, which they have refused to do. For now, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners remain skeptical about the sincerity of Iran's diplomatic overtures. While two of Iran's proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, have been hammered by Israel, Iran still arms and supports its third ally, the Houthis in Yemen, which have attacked Saudi Arabia. But as long as the Iranians are reaching a hand out to Riyadh, the Saudi leadership will take it. If Iran is serious, that would be a true realignment of the Mideast.”

Nytimes

Saudi businessman who is close to the monarchy and sits on the advisory board of Neom

20 Oct 2024 13 7

Masoud Pezeshkian

Inserted 3 months ago

“European countries and the United States don't want relations between countries [in the Middle East] to develop peacefully. The situation in the region has escalated dramatically because Israel doesn't recognize any international legal and humanitarian standards.”

Tass

Iranian President

11 Oct 2024 4 6

Ayman Mohyeldin

Inserted 3 years ago

“Days into their Presidency before launching a military operation in the Middle East: Biden: 37 days strikes #Syria, Trump: 9 days launches Op in #Yemen, Obama: 3 days strikes #Pakistan, Bush: 27 days strikes #Iraq. But tell me more about how we can turn a new page in the region?”

Twitter

25 Feb 2021 9 4

Nabil Boumonsef

Inserted 4 years ago

“Biden is more flexible and rational, but I do not expect fundamental changes, though there may be an easing of pressure with respect to sanctions until Biden’s Middle East team is in place.”

Reuters

Deputy editor-in-chief of An-Nahar newspaper

07 Nov 2020 2 5

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“There is no axis without access. The resistance is not done, but losing the ability to logistically support Hezbollah means the loss of Iran's strategic depth.”

“What has happened in Syria should be a wake-up call for all Arab autocrats. The region cannot endure long the reality that not a single Arab state has been credibly validated by its own people through constitutional or electoral means.”

“The world should know that in case of the expansion of war, its harmful effects will not be limited only to the West Asia region. Insecurity and instability can spread to other regions, even far away.”

“European countries and the United States don't want relations between countries [in the Middle East] to develop peacefully. The situation in the region has escalated dramatically because Israel doesn't recognize any international legal and humanitarian standards.”

“Days into their Presidency before launching a military operation in the Middle East: Biden: 37 days strikes #Syria, Trump: 9 days launches Op in #Yemen, Obama: 3 days strikes #Pakistan, Bush: 27 days strikes #Iraq. But tell me more about how we can turn a new page in the region?”

“Biden is more flexible and rational, but I do not expect fundamental changes, though there may be an easing of pressure with respect to sanctions until Biden’s Middle East team is in place.”

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